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Abstract
This article strives to reinterpret educational values in social pedagogy to provide a basis for a critique
of evidence-based practices. The article focuses on traditions and developments in social pedagogy
from a Danish perspective. However, the author often refers to ‘Denmark and the other Nordic
countries’ due to the fact that many of the traditions and developments mentioned have taken place
throughout Scandinavia. The author argues that ‘the social’ or ‘sociality’ in social pedagogy is not
an evidence-based concept and must therefore be continually open for interpretation by professionals
and clients alike. Furthermore, it is argued that this continual interpretive ‘quest’ (MacIntyre, 2003;
Taylor, 1989) is a foundational practice in social pedagogy. As a response to the prevalence of
‘evidence-based practice’ and so-called scientific ‘hard facts’ within the social professions, the author
argues for the necessity of interpretive spaces. The article explicates how the social pedagogical tradition
in Denmark has built on the German educational tradition of Bildung, i.e. a broad, holistic, humanistic
concept of education. The objective of Bildung is to educate not just toward knowledge but toward
sociality. To work with Bildung within a social pedagogical framework, it is argued, practitioners need to
be sensitive to historical, cultural and biographical narratives. However, such narrative sensitivity is only
one side of the coin in working with Bildung in social pedagogy. It is equally important is to develop a
culture that produces human presence (Gumbrecht, 2004). Practitioners must therefore navigate between
interpretation and presence. The author argues that the knowledge base that this type of practice builds
on is phenomenological hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1976; van Manen, 2016). From this perspective the
author discusses how the values of this tradition can be re-interpreted in a late modern society.
Keywords: Social pedagogy; Bildung; interpretive practice; moral frameworks; sociality
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Introduction
The question is often asked as to what the ‘social’ in social pedagogy actually represents.
One plausible answer is that the ‘social’ represents the socio-political context that informs a given
social pedagogical practice; to work to realise the ‘social’ in this case is to realise a given set of values in
practice (Erlandsen, 2013). In the past 30 years the main values that have dominated social pedagogical
and social political discourses in Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries are ‘prevention’, i.e. of
emotional, social and cognitive neglect, and ‘inclusion’ of vulnerable citizens into cultural communities
(Kristensen, 2013). In any case, working to realise a specific set of values so that they become embedded
in the very fabric of day-to-day practices requires that social pedagogical practitioners themselves have a
finely tuned understanding of local cultures and of how such cultures develop (Hatton, 2013). The ‘social’
of social pedagogy is no doubt a complex phenomenon and theorists often ask if it is possible to develop an
overall theory for social pedagogy (Jensen, 2013). If such a meta-theory were possible – and I’m not sure
it is – it would have to make room for what I will call interpretive spaces. Interpretive spaces are spaces
where the practitioner and client can voice their own understandings of the ‘social’. In this article I will
argue that social pedagogy is essentially a hermeneutical practice that calls for reflective and deliberative
contexts, not just for the practitioner but also for the client. I will argue that the main knowledge
base in social pedagogy is hermeneutical in that practitioners and clients strive to develop meaningful
interpretations and understandings of the ‘social’ in order to develop relationships and communities
of practice (Hämäläinen, 2003). Such interpretive practices are based on cultural narratives and lived
experiences of everyday life. This requires a phenomenological openness to the significance of lived
experiences and a sensitivity to cultural narratives. Precisely because phenomenological openness to
everyday experience is essential in social pedagogy, I will argue for phenomenological hermeneutics
(van Manen, 2016; Ricoeur, 1976; Heidegger, 2004; Gadamer, 2004) as a suitable methodology for this
field of practice.
Social pedagogy’s quest for ‘the social’ in the age of evidence
The past 30 years have seen a growing tendency within the social professions to move toward
evidence-based practice, with a view to greater accountability and value for money. By ‘social professions’
I am referring to professions that work to better the health, welfare or education of the general public.
What the social professions have in common is that they involve direct face-to-face contact with the
general public, which gives their professional practitioners a certain amount of reflective autonomy in
their dealings with their clients. Lipsky (2010) refers to members of this group of professions as ‘street
level bureaucrats’ and points to the fact that such autonomy often presents a dilemma for the individual
professional. How should the professional use such autonomy? To the benefit of the client? To the benefit
of the profession? In Denmark, as well as in other Scandinavian countries, the social professions are
presently referred to as ‘welfare professions’ (velfærdsprofessioner), and as such are subject to strict
controls and regulations to a degree that affects the practitioner’s ability to reflect over concrete practice.
However, the coupling of social policy and evidence-based paradigms with the view to creating better
social professions often overlooks one important aspect of the practitioner’s task: the power aspect
(Pedersen, 2011). Professional autonomy is essential in order to reflect on the power the practitioner has
over the client. I do not wish to criticise evidence-based practice, which I believe develops many important
aspects of professionalisation in the social professions. However, evidence-based practice and ‘hard facts’
do not and cannot remove the practitioner’s need for interpretive spaces. Such interpretive spaces provide
the means to reflect on everyday experience, cultural narratives and professional ethics. Furthermore, the
application of ‘hard facts’ is in itself context-sensitive, which in itself requires interpretation. Concepts
such as ‘evidence’ and ‘evidence-based practice’ signify political will that researchers and practitioners
may forget to question.
I argue that social pedagogy in the Scandinavian countries has traditionally implied deliberative
and dialogical practices, engaging professional and client alike. The proliferation of reflective practice
from the 1980s on rendered reflection as exclusively ‘professional reflection’. This shift was signified
historically by Schön’s classic 1983 book The Reflective Practitioner – How Professionals Think in Action
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(Schön, 1991). However, I would argue that to speak solely of ‘How Professionals Think in Action’ misses
an important point when it comes to social pedagogy, in that it misses the simple fact that the deliberative
and dialogical basis for such reflection is rooted in micro-dialogues with clients and the families of clients.
These very dialogues are the democratic basis for social pedagogy. On a macro level, the development of
social pedagogy as an independent field of practice should be seen in the context of the overall democratic
development in the Nordic countries from the turn of the twentieth century onwards. However, the validity
of this point depends on how we understand what a profession actually is. If we understand professions
in the Weberian sense of the word, i.e. as power struggles between actors to dominate a specific field
of practice with a view to generating status and capital, then we fail to see that deliberation with clients
and their families may have a fundamental role in the practice and identity of a profession (Weicher,
2003). Max Weber (1864–1920), the German sociologist, was one of the first to conduct research into
the concept of profession. Weber’s functionalist understanding of profession would render professional
reflection as a tool or resource for professionals to establish and integrate their dominance in a given field
of practice (Weber, 1978). On the other hand, if we understand a profession as a human organisation
that builds on a set of altruistic values with the view to achieving a set of goods for humankind, then
Parsonianism is relevant. This approach was developed in Talcott Parsons’s (1902–1979) research into the
sociology of professions. Parsons studied the role professions played in the development of democracy in
the USA in the 1930s to 1970s, arguing that due to their complexity, modern societies could not exist
without the professions (Parsons, 2016). To be professional is to be committed to ‘social action’, to be
true to a set of altruistic values, above all to have solidarity with the client, patient or pupil in question
(Parsons, 2016). The professional is driven by the desire to contribute to the wellbeing of humankind.
The motivation for such ‘social action’ is philanthropic. Where Weber developed a descriptive framework
in his understanding of bureaucracy and the professions, Parsons understood professionalism and ‘social
action’ as normative phenomena. Parsons is also highly descriptive in his approach to this normativity.
However there is a tension between the descriptive and the normative in Parsons’s theoretical framework.
This tension is also discernible today when we speak of ‘social professions’ or ‘welfare professions’ whose
objectives are to promote ‘the social’. For is it possible to be completely descriptive in our interpretation
of the social world and social action? Is it possible to understand ‘the social’ without being to some
degree normative? I don’t think so. When I make the claim that social pedagogy is integrally linked to
the overall democratic development in the Nordic countries from the 1900s onwards, I am drawing on a
Parsonian understanding of profession. Democracy in this context is not a bureaucratic state form. I am
referring to democracy as a way of life, as a form of praxis that grows from the bottom up (Koch, 1995).
From this perspective, social pedagogy has essentially always been located at grass roots and community
level (Hatton, 2013).
To arrive at an understanding of what ‘the social’ in social pedagogy connotes we must look at the
word ‘pedagogy’. Many researchers agree that the social pedagogical relationship between professional
and client is essentially an educational relationship with the view to supporting the client in his/her
endeavours to lead a dignified life (Erlandsen, 2013; Hatton, 2013; Hämäläinen, 2003; Kristensen, 2013;
Madsen, 1993). Dignity is a central concept (which I will return to later). Social pedagogy refers to
professional work with people who have ‘problems’ that undermine their ability to exist, interact and live
with self-dignity, i.e. homeless people, substance abusers, children in care, children in need of care, senior
citizens in need of care, people with disabilities etc. As opposed to merely giving technical or financial
assistance as means of compensation, the social pedagogical ideal is to educate the client to live with the
problem and to live with the social distress caused by the problem (Hämäläinen, 2003). It is precisely the
educational aspect of the relationship that marks the border between social pedagogy and social work
(Hämäläinen, 2003). Within the contemporary field of social work practice social problems are researched
and a variety of methods are made available to assist clients with challenges and disabilities. However, it
could be argued that this approach is purely compensatory and that the client’s existential needs go unseen.
By existential needs I am referring to the client’s need to find meaning with life. The struggle for meaning
is often seen as an individual project in late modern society (Giddens, 1991). However, such a struggle is
not possible without interaction between the individual and a community of others. Furthermore, I would
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argue that the individual’s struggle for meaning in a material community of others is the essential structure
of ‘the social’, i.e. without this aspect ‘the social’ fails to exist. To live a dignified life, all humans need to
undertake this struggle for existential meaning. However, humans with special needs and disabilities often
require professional pedagogical support for this undertaking. The difficulty of this task for professional
and client alike boils down to the fact that there are no universal guidelines for what makes for meaningful.
Alasdair MacIntyre (2003) likens the struggle for meaning in human practices to the ‘medieval quest’; i.e.
the quest is more often than not a journey without a destination and without a goal. The idea of the quest
is that the destination and goals are discovered along the way. However for MacIntyre (2003), who writes
from an Aristotelian perspective, such a quest for meaning can take place only within a specific practice
and with a specific set of virtues. Virtues in this sense are skills or qualities that the practitioner/client
develops in the pursuit of meaning, i.e. curiosity, reflection, stamina, focus, empathy etc. Virtues are
not goals in themselves, but are ‘goods internal’ to practice (MacIntyre, 2003). If allowed to evolve
sufficiently, practices develop their own interiority. As ‘goods internal’ to a specific practice, the virtues
cannot be transferred to other practices (MacIntyre, 2003). However, contemporary ‘evidence-based
practice’ and its reliance on transferrable skills (competency) seems to have little grasp of the interiority
of practices. I am not arguing that social pedagogy does not require evidence for best practice. However,
I am trying to highlight the importance of interpretive spaces concerning the development of the interiority
of practices. The knowledge base for this argument is phenomenological hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1976;
Gadamer, 2004).
Schmidt (1999) writes that pedagogical relationships are characterised by the ironic fact that they are
relationships that are formed with the view to being terminated at some stage or another. Once the child
or client reaches a certain level of autonomy then the relationship has served its purpose and becomes
terminated. Social pedagogical relationships may however be different in their structure, as clients may be
dependent on professional support networks throughout their entire lifespan. Social pedagogical support
networks incorporate individual and collective axes of client participation. By focusing on practical
activities in communal settings, the goal has been to create a protective/preventive shell against the
fragmentation of the client’s social and cultural lifeworld (Erlandsen, 2013; Madsen, 1993). Within this
protective shell, the social pedagogical ideal has often been to develop a holistic practice with the client,
i.e. a practice that places value on the client as a cultural, social, deliberative, biological, spiritual and
intellectual being (Jensen, 2013). To work and be part of a working community (arbejdsfællesskab) and
at the same time to enjoy the benefits of the protective shell has traditionally been the focus of holistic
practices in the Nordic countries. To work with others has been seen not just as a work process but as
an educational process. Homo faber and homo educandus are closely intertwined in social pedagogy.
In both German and Danish traditions, work is seen as a foundation for democratic cultures (Jensen,
2013). The Marxist-inspired Frankfurt School, with intellectuals such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse
and Negt, conceptualised ‘work’ as a necessary activity for human thriving, the argument being that
work generates identity and culture. In 1947 Horkheimer and Adorno (1996) criticised what they saw
as modernity’s belief in progress for being based on a narrow and reductive concept of rationality, i.e.
the rational as measurability. Their argument was that this reductive rationality overlooks important
phenomenological aspects of human life. From a social pedagogical perspective, it might be added to
the argument that precisely such phenomenological aspects of human life are fundamental to creating
meaning for clients and contribute to the very possibility of living a dignified life. In 1981 the German
philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1985) reformulated this critique, arguing that the narrow concept of
rationality used by state, economists and public institutions was erosive of the civil logic in human
relationships. More directly, Habermas (1985) wrote that the System colonised the Lifeworld. In Denmark
and the other Nordic countries after the Second World War, Marxist-inspired theory (such as that of the
Frankfurt School) fueled much of the intellectual discourse surrounding social pedagogy. The common
denominator for these discourses was the call to avoid alienation. To achieve this, social pedagogical
movements and institutions needed political, social and economic resources to create the types of support
structures needed by clients. Marxist influences and Marxist values in many ways constituted the centre of
this burgeoning professional identity. The Marxist value set became an integral part of the Danish social
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pedagogical tradition, where the client’s daily life was insulated against what was seen as the detrimental
effects of the capitalistic society (Jensen, 2013).
Retrieving moral frameworks: sentimentality or necessity?
As stated at the beginning of this article, the knowledge base for social pedagogy is best described
as phenomenological hermeneutics, i.e. knowledge based on openness to everyday experience and
phenomena together with knowledge based on an understanding of cultural narratives. In order to
understand how values are interpreted over time it is important to retrieve older cultural narratives. This is
essential when reinterpreting professional values in social pedagogy. We live in an ‘age of measurement’
(Biesta, 2010) wherein so-called ‘hard facts’ dominate political and professional discourses. Attempting
to retrieve insights from the past may quickly be seen as an act of sentimentality. However, I agree
with Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1931–), who argues that humans act on ‘moral intuition’
and that to understand such intuition it is necessary to look to the narratives of the past (Taylor, 1989).
Articulating ‘moral intuition’ becomes necessary when values conflict, i.e. in contexts where professional
practitioners are engaged in decision-making. Taylor (1989) writes that our moral intuitions are linked
to social ontologies, which differ from culture to culture, from community to community and also from
period to period. A social or moral ontology is the most fundamental description of what it is to be human.
Taylor (1989, p. 5) argues that such fundamental descriptions can never be objective as they are rooted in
a basic set of values. This basic set of values are not chosen by the individual but evolve in communities
and traditions. Although such values form the ‘background picture’ to the individual’s thoughts and
actions, the individual is often oblivious to this (Taylor, 1989, p. 8). The ‘background picture’ becomes
clearer to the individual when he or she is forced to articulate a moral intuition in a concrete situation,
i.e. a conflict or dilemma. This can, as Taylor (1989, p. 9) writes, often prove to be a controversial and
confusing experience for the individual. Discovering that one is not author of one’s ‘own’ values may be
an unsettling experience in the age of radical individualism. As Taylor (1989) writes, ‘The agent himself
or herself is not necessarily the best authority, at least not at the outset’ (p. 9).
However, this doesn’t imply that the agent is powerless. The agent must take up the task of
articulation. Moral intuitions are merely ‘strong evaluations’ that agents experience in specific situations
and they require language in order to be interpreted and understood (Taylor, 1989, p. 4). Such strong
evaluations manifest in the most necessary of human practices, such as upbringing, care-giving, education,
family life, work and political activity etc. It is not possible to interpret or understand an individual’s
strong evaluations without taking the overall moral frameworks or ‘background picture’ into account.
Taylor (1989) alternates between the expressions ‘moral frameworks’ and ‘frameworks’, describing the
effect a framework has on the individual thus: ‘To think, feel, judge within such a framework is to function
with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparably higher than the
others. . . ’ (p. 20).
Taylor’s (1989) view of articulating ‘the good’ as a non-individual process brings to the fore the
importance of deliberation in professional practice. Social pedagogy has traditionally been characterised
by deliberative processes concerning ‘the social’. However, the deliberative space for practitioners to
take up the task of articulation seems to be disappearing rapidly from the social professions. Deliberation
understood as a verbalised form of reflection that is shared between practitioners is becoming a rarer
feature in professional practice due to the political demand for scientific knowledge and evidence-based
practice. The ideal of political and professional accountability requires the type of irrefutable knowledge
that objectifies practice. This ideal leads slowly to practitioners standing outside of practice having lost
contact with the interiority or the ‘goods internal’ to the practice (MacIntyre, 2003). The practitioner
becomes a type of naturalist who studies phenomena from the outside. However as Taylor (1989, p. 70)
writes the ‘naturalist stance’ cannot exist without implicit ideas of ‘the good’. In other words, the
‘naturalist stance’ removes the very values and moral horizons that it needs to evolve. Professional
deliberation requires that practitioners do not shy away from concepts of ‘the good’. In the case of social
pedagogy, practitioners need to begin speaking about what ‘good education’ is in an age of measurement
(Biesta, 2010). Taylor (1989, p. 15) points to 3 axes of moral thinking that he argues are necessary to take
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into account when articulating ‘the good’: (1) obligation to others; (2) to live a full life; and (3) dignity.
To lead such a life, to strive after ‘the good’ in this way, requires education in the broadest sense of the
word; in the sense of social, ethical and cultural formation. I will discuss this in the following paragraph.
Bildung and social pedagogy
In the following section I will argue that social pedagogy as we have known it in Denmark and the
other Nordic countries builds fundamentally on the educational concept of Bildung. So much so that
without Bildung as a value and as a tradition, social pedagogy becomes something else. Bildung refers to
a liberal, humanistic educational tradition in Europe that has roots in Greek antiquity. Bildung is a German
word and refers to education in the broadest sense, i.e. bringing together various disciplines into a whole
such as upbringing, socialisation, education and moral self-formation (Gustavsson, 1996; von Oettingen,
2003). Bildung is an integrative concept in that it designates a bringing together of various aspects of the
individual into a whole; the whole being not so much a complete personality or identity but an integrated
character. In some historical periods the focus and objective of Bildung has been the collective whilst in
other periods it has been the individual. However, as Gustavsson (1996) argues Bildung is best understood
if we see it from both collective and individual perspectives simultaneously.
As a fundamental concept for educational thinking and practice, Bildung is a concept that causes as
much disagreement as agreement. This is due to the fact that it is a highly normative concept that requires
continual deliberation and interpretation. We see this in the Danish discourse over the past 20 years.
Schmidt (1999) and Hammershøj (2003) argue that Bildung in contemporary society must be understood
as ‘self-formation’ and that the objective is to develop individualism. Kemp (2013) conversely argues
that the objective of Bildung is cosmopolitanism, i.e. that the highest goal of education is to prepare
the youth to be citizens of the world. Korsgaard (2004) meanwhile sees Bildung as democratisation and
argues that Bildung is essentially about preparing the youth for active citizenship. However these various
positions differ, they seem to agree on one important point: that the overall objective of Bildung is to
educate individuals toward sociality; that acquisition of experience, skills and knowledge should prepare
individuals to live together and find meaning in coexistence. As mentioned earlier in this article, the
role of social pedagogy is to provide support networks for individuals who because of special needs or
challenges are inhibited in living meaningful lives in communities of others.
Von Oettingen (2003) describes Bildung as a pedagogical paradox: how can educationalists remove
the freedom from younger generations in order to teach them how to live as free and autonomous
individuals? The paradox lies in the fact that the individual’s freedom as a rational being is possible only
when he or she is socialised into a specific culture of others. To actualise this socialisation is to enforce a
certain amount of symbolic power on the individual with the view to his/her acquisition of freedom as a
rational being at some later stage. Working in social pedagogy can possibly require even greater uses of
power in order to support the client’s sociality. Because the pedagogical paradox becomes more acute in
such practices, practitioners must continually reflect and deliberate on the values that form the basis for
their actions.
As an integrative humanistic concept, Bildung however must never become sheer force or
indoctrination. The balance between individual freedom and the symbolic power of the community
has been the focus of most discourses concerning Bildung from the Enlightenment period to today.
The challenge of securing individual freedom and simultaneously maintaining the cohesion of the
community led to the establishment of pedagogy as a university discipline in Europe around 1750–1800.
Before this period, pedagogy was regarded as a minor discipline within the field of philosophy, often
being referred to as philosophy of education. As Korsgaard (2004) points out, the early stages of the
Enlightenment period in Germany and Denmark saw an increased political focus on pedagogy. There was
a need for insights into how pedagogy could contribute to the ethical, social and cultural formation of
individuals. The political context that formed the background for these developments in Denmark and
Germany from the 1750s to 1800s was one of growing nationalism. In Denmark and Germany politicians,
intellectuals and educationalists where asking how to develop moral autonomy in individuals and at the
same time how to develop a strong sense of national identity (Korsgaard, 2004). In 1779, E.C. Trapp
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became Germany’s first professor of pedagogy; in 1800 C. Sander became the Nordic countries’ first
pedagogy professor (Korsgaard, 2004). Both were philosophers who strived to re-interpret Bildung in this
new political context.
Although nationalism can be said to be the dominant ideology in most European countries during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, other ideologies such as philanthropy and cosmopolitanism where
strong contenders in the battle to articulate the relationship between the individual and the collective
(Korsgaard, 2004). In fact, Korsgaard (2004) argues that the most progressive forces that brought about
change in education were philanthropists. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) gave a series of lectures on
pedagogy in 1776–1777, published with the title On Pedagogy (Kant, 2000) shortly before Kant’s death
in 1803. Not only does On Pedagogy provide important insights into Kant’s pedagogical thinking,
it also provides insights into how Kant – often regarded as a conservative thinker – became inspired by
philanthropists such as John Bernhard Basedow (1724–1790) (Lyhne, 2000a). It was precisely Basedow’s
practical and integrative approach to Bildung that inspired Kant. However both Kant and Basedow owed
much of their progressive thinking to another philanthropist, the French philosopher and pedagogue
J.J. Rousseau (1712–1778).
Like Rousseau, Basedow and Kant strived to formulate an integrative pedagogy that brought the
pupil’s body, senses and intellect together. Basedow founded a school – ‘The Philanthropinum’ – at
Dessau in Germany. Both Rousseau and Basedow believed strongly in the innate goodness of humanity.
Rousseau’s argument was that exposure to urban culture destroyed the moral integrity of individuals
(Rousseau, 1997), and that life especially in larger cities made humans more concerned with outer
appearances than with the inner human condition. In such a conception, the ideal pedagogical setting
would be one removed from the vanities of urban life; it should be close to nature, forming a province in
its own right – a ‘pedagogical province’ (Rousseau, 1997).
Although Basedow’s school was situated in a town and not in the countryside, he strived to create
a holistic pedagogy that put the pupil’s senses and embodied experiences at its centre. The type of
pedagogical holism that Basedow practiced rested on two focal points. Firstly, it saw the pupil as an
embodiment of five senses: an embodiment that needed to be awakened in order to achieve intellectual
skills (Lyhne, 2000a). Secondly, it saw the pupil not exclusively as a citizen of Germany but as a citizen
of the world (Lyhne, 2000a). By using their own senses and their own capacities to make judgements – as
opposed to depending on the judgements of others – when confronted with challenges or when conducting
experiments, the pupils would grow into independent and autonomous citizens (Lyhne, 2000b). The school
at Dessau emphasised the formative importance of practical disciplines, i.e. handwork, crafts, art and
woodwork. However, its curriculum was by no means anti-theoretical. Its field of disciplines was very
large compared to other schools at the time. Beyond the practical disciplines, the curriculum ranged
from languages, physics, zoology, botany and geography to bookkeeping (Lyhne, 2000a). The school
also differed from others in a number of other ways. Corporal punishment and disrespectful attitudes
toward pupils were forbidden. Lessons were conducted in German and not in Latin, making it possible
for pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds to participate. It was the norm in Germany and
other European countries in the 1700s to conduct teaching and instruction in Latin, catering exclusively
for the children of a small but growing elite (Korsgaard, 2004). By legitimising the use of the mother
tongue, Basedow’s influence had a significant and permanent democratising effect on education. N.F.S.
Grundtvig followed this example in Denmark by making the Danish language the official language of the
Danish Folk High school (Korsgaard, 2004). Furthermore, the Philanthropinum at Dessau also differed
from other German schools at the time in its emphasis on the experiential dimension of learning (Lyhne,
2000a). Factual knowledge from books was not seen as enough to develop autonomous intellects. Such
an autonomous intellect could be developed only if pupils used their own experiences in experiments and
practical application. Learning mathematical formulas and historical dates by heart was forbidden (Lyhne,
2000a). It must be noted that this was roughly 200 years before the first learning theories were developed
and appeared in educational discourses.
The concept of Bildung has been reinterpreted many times since Rousseau, Kant and Basedow.
However, I would argue that it is no less relevant a pedagogical concept today than it was in the early
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Enlightenment period. Above all in social pedagogy, where clients are deeply dependent on practitioners’
care and support networks, the need for an integrative and humanistic Bildung is acute. The question is,
how should we interpret Bildung in social pedagogy today?
Reinterpreting Bildung in contemporary social pedagogy
There is a fundamental difference between Enlightenment interpretations of Bildung and modern or
late modern interpretations. Philosophers such as Kant and Rousseau organised their educational concepts
according to the belief that ‘the good’ or ‘goodness’ existed on a universal level and that the right type
of pedagogical intervention and tact would guide the pupil toward greater moral insights. This belief
is evident in Kant’s pedagogy, where he characterises Bildung as being organised in four successive
phases: discipline, cultivation, civilisation and moral understanding (Kant, 2000). The final phase, moral
understanding, is not based on religious practices but encompasses the exercise of moral judgements
and rational thinking. It is at this level of abstraction that the pupil can reflect on what Kant called the
categorical imperative: (roughly translated) to act as if your actions were to become the rule for all
men’s actions (Kant, 1999). However, throughout modernity and especially in late modernity, such belief
in a universal ‘good’ for all mankind began to evaporate. The ‘good’ became an individual question
often linked to the search for ‘meaningfulness’ or the exercise of ‘taste’ (Hammershøj, 2003; Schmidt,
1999). At the end of the modern period (around the 1950s) the pedagogical focus moved from developing
sociality and morality to encouraging individual ‘self-activity’ (Grue-Sørensen, 1950). The objective
became a question of how to effect, teach, inspire, provoke and guide the individual in a way that would
lead to ‘self-activity’ (Grue-Sørensen, 1950; von Oettingen, 2003). This development has taken on an
unforeseen intensity in today’s late modern period. As both Schmidt (1999) and Hammershøj (2003)
argue, late modernity has radically changed conditions for Bildung, leaving us with no alternative but
‘self-formation’. Both Schmidt (1999) and Hammershøj (2003) argue that ‘self-formation’ does not refer
to the type of ‘moral formation’ discussed by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant and Rousseau, but
refers to the ‘aesthetical formation’ of individual taste. Drawing on contemporary sociology Hammershøj
(2003, pp. 114–6) describes late modern conditions for Bildung in a way that backs up his argument that
‘self-formation’, understood as individualised Bildung, is the only way forward. Hammershøj (2003)
describers the conditions of late modernity in the following way:
- Individual liberation due to the erosion of traditional bonds
- Loss of stability and certainty due to the loss of the idea of truth
- Undermining of the legitimacy of authority, and thereby privatisation of morals (114–6)
(my translation)
However, I would argue that a relevant critique of ‘self-formation’ as it is explicated by Schmidt
(1999) and Hammershøj (2003) is that radically individualised Bildung overlooks the importance of
community in the formation of individual identity. Qua educational theory, ‘self-formation’, with its
insistence on the self, ignores the fundamental role of others and otherness in the development of
values. Although clients are also radically individualised products of late modernity, contemporary social
pedagogical communities can continue to build what Taylor (1989) calls the three axes of morality:
obligations to others, to live a full life and dignity. The challenge for the social pedagogue is to
professionalise the three concepts into a unified practice. The German social pedagogical tradition
of building relationships based on Haltung seems to be a good place to start (Hatton, 2013; Mührel, 2015).
Haltung refers to an embodied attitude of profound respect for the other. As Mührel (2015) argues, the
practitioner can never completely understand the client by means of language, theories and concepts,
and although it is necessary to seek the best possible or most fitting interpretations in a given situation
it is also necessary to accept the limits of language. Mührel (2015) is not suggesting professional or
conceptual resignation here. However, drawing on the work of Levinas (1996), he argues that although we
may have rich and comprehensive conceptualisations of the client, i.e. with the help of educational theory,
psychology, sociology anthropology etc., such formalised knowledge is not sufficient to encounter the
presence of the client. Being present with the other requires accepting the limitations of language in that
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moment of togetherness. This is, needless to say, a difficult zone for the professional to be in. As Mührel
(2015) argues, the other (the client) will always remain a mystery that I must not decipher but must regard
with profound respect. To reduce the client’s behavior to mere conceptualisations is to ignore his or her
strangeness or otherness. Along the same lines of argumentation, Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup
(1905–1981), refers to the individual’s urørlighedszone or untouchable zone, hereby highlighting a private
individual space beyond any form of conceptual understanding (Løgstrup, 1978). Although manifest
in encounters between individuals, Haltung is not an individual attitude. As Hatton (2013) points out,
Haltung is linked to a person’s lebensweltorientierung, i.e. a person’s social orientation in a lifeworld of
others. In other words Haltung is an ethos that expresses a community of others, whether they are present
or not.
To develop this type of practice is a twofold task. Practitioners must strive to develop a ‘culture
of interpretation’ and a ‘culture of presence’ (Gumbrecht, 2004). As Gumbrecht (2004) reminds us,
presence embodies something fundamentally human that language ‘cannot convey’ – we have to be there
to know. Drawing on Gumbrecht (2004) I would argue that this twofold practice in social pedagogy is
educational because it incorporates lebensweltorientierung into concrete encounters, and because it also it
generates new reflections in the oscillating space between ‘interpretation’ and ‘presence’. Educational
values such as ‘dignity’ or Haltung can never become completely defined in this space. The objective of
educationalists and practitioners alike, I would argue, must therefore be to continually reinterpret such
values as an integral part of theory and practice. The knowledge base that practitioners can draw on in
order to take on the dual task of developing interpretation and attunement to presence is phenomenological
hermeneutics (Ricoeur, 1976; van Manen, 2016).
Developing ‘interpretative cultures’ and ‘presence cultures’ side by side is no easy task. As Giddens (1991)
points out, late modern institutions hinder the open interpretation of concrete experiences if such
experiences do not fit into the overall narrative of the institution. Presence becomes a disturbance
to the smooth running of things. Giddens (1991) writes that the reflexive self, i.e. of the practitioner or the
client, is sometimes forced to repress what is deeply human in order to maintain a coherent self-narrative
and/or to be loyal to the narrative of the institution. This institutionalised act of repression is essentially
non-voluntary. Giddens (1991) refers to it as the ‘sequestration of experience’. This raises a deeply
problematic point for social pedagogy, in that practitioners strive to create support networks and existential
spaces for clients to lead potentially complete and meaningful lives. Sequestering what is deeply human
from such lived spaces is detrimental to this endeavour. Also, as Giddens (1991, p. 244) further points
out, it is often the types of experiences that raise difficult questions or ‘potentially disturbing existential
questions’ that are repressed in late modern institutions. Because practitioners and clients alike are forced
to keep the narrative going in order to avoid incoherence, certain aspects of being human are omitted from
day-to-day life. As Giddens (1991) writes, daily life is separated from what is potentially disturbing –
‘particularly experiences to do with sickness, madness, criminality, sexuality and death’ (p. 244).
Although sequestration of our day-to-day experiences may be beyond our control, I would not
necessarily say that we are completely powerless. In fact I would argue that this problem highlights the
need for knowledge of narrative structures and how they affect identity building. Furthermore, I would
argue that the more aware practitioners become of narrative structures in their day-to-day practices, the
more reflective they can become in their interpretations, and also the more adept they can become in their
attunement to presence. What is called for is a narrative approach to Bildung in social pedagogy.
American philosopher Richard Rorty (1931–2007) argued that Bildung in late modern society must
be understood as narrative Bildung (Rorty, 1989). Rorty was interested in Bildung because of what he
saw as the ‘contingency’ of human identity in both individuals and communities (Rorty, 1979; Rorty,
1989). Contingency of human identity highlights the point that no human identity is more ‘true’ or more
‘real’ than others. Rorty (1979; 1989) takes up the argument that human identity is highly vulnerable to
fragmentation, change and suffering, and to alleviate these detrimental traits humans cling to ideas of
truth. The objective of education as Bildung in Rorty’s optic is threefold: (1) to develop human identity
by acquisition of knowledge and reading of books; (2) to cultivate an understanding of the contingency
of identity; and (3) to cultivate an empathy in individuals towards the vulnerability of the identity of
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others (Rorty, 1989). Although Rorty’s interest in Bildung, together with his educational arguments, are
contextualised in the mainstream educational system in the USA (i.e. high schools and universities),
I would argue that his explication of Bildung has particular poignancy for contemporary social pedagogy
because it tackles the question of identity head on. As Rorty (1979) points out, the difficulty with using the
concept of Bildung in American/Anglo-Saxon educational discourses is to find an accurate translation into
English. He suggests the word ‘edification’ (Rorty, 1979, p. 360), which I would argue is a problematical
translation in that ‘edification’ may for some have religious connotations. In my view, continuing to use
the word Bildung has a value in that it reminds us of the historical, cultural and philosophical context
the concept evolved in. However I agree with Rorty’s (1979) argument that Bildung is essentially about
continuing ‘the conversation of mankind’ in the best possible way.
I would argue that the task of continuing the ‘conversation of mankind’ in social pedagogy is about
supporting, facilitating and inspiring the development of client narratives, i.e. their personal biographies.
For the social pedagogue the task boils down to creating concrete experiences that generate meaningful
narratives. This may sound simpler than it is. Many clients who are dependent on support networks
have limited ability to create meaningful and coherent life narratives – some clients have no ability
whatsoever. The reasons for this fall into 3 categories: first, mental illness or disability; second, limited
linguistic capital due to social disadvantages; third, substance abuse. The challenge for a contemporary
social pedagogy is to develop environments that inspire and nurture personal and cultural narratives.
For Rorty (1979), Bildung is precisely that: ‘the “poetic” activity of thinking up. . . new aims, new words,
or new disciplines, followed by. . . the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings’ (p. 360).
For clients without verbal ability, a broader concept of narrative can be applied in practice,
incorporating non-verbal forms of expression such as arts and crafts, sports, music, dance or togetherness.
Social pedagogical practices work to care for some of the most vulnerable people in society. To understand
this vulnerability it is important to see beyond the actual disability, illness or neglect suffered and
see the social problems that arise in the aftermath, one of the main problems being social isolation.
As Imogen Tyler (2013) points out, when citizens do not have the linguistic competency or cultural
possibility to establish their own coherent narratives they often become the objects of other narratives.
Tyler (2013), who writes in a UK context, warns that contemporary neo-liberal discourses, geared toward
profit and efficiency of workforce, tend to discard as human waste those who don’t fit into this equation.
Although Tyler (2013) mainly focuses on the plight of asylum seekers, travellers and socially
excluded youth, her arguments are highly relevant for those citizens who need social pedagogical care.
In all cases we are dealing with human beings who are unable to establish a coherent sense of self-identity
and as such run the risk of being made ‘abject’ by society. As Tyler (2013) writes, human beings are
made ‘abject’ when they for various reasons cannot define who they are, and so become subjugated
under the tastes and definitions of others. This lack of self-definitional power characterised by the
‘abject’ individual or group is, according to Tyler (2013), linked to a range of disadvantages from lack of
socio-cultural capital, to social exclusion, to restrictive and inhuman institutional frameworks. The ‘abject’
is constructed in societal and political discourse as the ‘other’ and is mostly framed as a problem that
requires solving. Groups and individuals who are made ‘abject’ mostly find themselves on the receiving
end of negative emotions of disgust, hatred and fear. It is therefore important when working with narratives
in social pedagogy that practitioners draw on a strengths perspective, i.e. by locating personal and cultural
resources, so that the client’s biography is not exclusively built on disability and disadvantage. Schmidt
(1999) points out that working with self-formational processes is fraught with conflict because identity
formation is based on taste/distaste for different ways of life. Schmidt (1999) argues that conflict is not a
symptom of self-formational processes, but is the very ground self-formational processes are built on.
Writing from a social worker perspective, Guo and Tsui (2010) call for a strengths perspective
that values not resilience alone but also resistance. Guo and Tsui (2010) argue that practitioners should
work with reflective practices that are based on a knowledge of clients’ positions within social-cultural
communities. Failure to work intelligently with conflict and resistance in practice would not only betray
the democratic tradition of social pedagogy, but would also inevitably lead to what Belton (2018) calls
‘cultural colonialism’. The challenge posed for a pedagogy of difference, I would argue, cannot be met
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with evidence-based practice alone and calls for a renewed focus on reflective and interpretive practices.
As Arendt (2005) writes, to reflect is to consider a diversity of human voices in the struggle to articulate
one’s own responsibility. Furthermore, Arendt (2005) describes this as a process that proceeds through
three phases: (1) building complex narratives based on real experience; (2) deliberating with oneself; and
(3) deliberating with others. Developing practitioner judgement is not about replacing evidence-based
practice but about complementing it. As Brian Taylor (2013) points out, robust cultures of decision
making require both evidence and practitioner insights; one cannot replace the other.
Conclusion
This article is a critique of the prevalent use of evidence-based practice in social pedagogy. I have
argued for what I see as the necessity of an interpretive approach to social pedagogy in order to work
with the normative aspects of practice. Firstly, I have highlighted the point that the ‘social’ in social
pedagogy requires continual interpretation among practitioners and clients. Secondly, I have drawn on
Charles Taylor’s (1989) theory of moral frameworks in order to understand the fundamental role that values
play in practice. Thirdly, I have discussed Bildung as the main European educational tradition within
which social pedagogy has evolved. The question is how we can adapt an originally Enlightenment-era
concept into contemporary social pedagogy. To answer this, I have drawn on Richard Rorty’s (1989;
1979) narrative understanding of ‘Bildung’. I have argued that the formational ideal must be to work with
personal and cultural identity in a pedagogy of difference: a pedagogy that understands the importance
of self-identity; furthermore, a pedagogy that understands the importance of a community of others in
the formation of self-identity. To work in such a normative field is highly conflictual and gives rise to a
renewed focus on reflective practice.
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